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THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW IN
CRIMINAL CASES: WHO HAS THE FINAL
WORD?
Jennifer Anders*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the Montana Legislature drastically limited a crimi-
nal defendant's right to have alleged constitutional errors reviewed
for the first time on appeal where defense counsel failed to raise a
proper objection at the trial court level.' Until recently, the impact
of these changes, both on the defendant's right of appeal and on
the Montana Supreme Court's scope of appellate review, went rela-
tively unnoticed. In State v. Huebner,2 the court ordered the par-
ties sua sponte to brief and argue the constitutionality of the 1983
law, suggesting that it somehow limited the judiciary's inherent au-
thority to correct "plain errors" on appeal.3
The Huebner majority did not ultimately address the consti-
tutionality of the statute in question, rather the court found that
the errors, though not properly objected to, were not prejudicial
and therefore did not warrant reversal." In contrast, the dissenting
justice indicated a strong willingness not only to reverse the de-
fendant's conviction, but to declare the 1983 law an unconstitu-
tional infringement upon the court's exclusive rulemaking author-
ity. If the dissenting opinion indicates the disposition of a future
majority of the court, the question of the statute's constitutional
* Assistant Attorney General, State of Montana; J.D., University of Montana, 1988;
B.A., University of California, 1982.
1. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-20-701(2) (1991).
2. - Mont. -_, 827 P.2d 1260 (1992).
3. Specifically, the court ordered the parties to address whether "the factors listed in
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-20-701(2), which limit this Court's power to apply the 'plain error'
doctrine to constitutional violations (are) unconstitutional." See Montana Supreme Court
Order of June 4, 1991. The author participated in the Huebner appeal as Assistant Attorney
General for the State of Montana.
4. Id. at -, 827 P.2d at 1264. The errors at issue in Huebner were twofold: (1) the
district court failed to give an instruction on the presumption of innocence, and (2) the
district court gave inconsistent instructions on the state's burden of proof in a criminal
prosecution. The majority determined that none of the errors were prejudicial because the
defendant, by his own testimony, established "all of the elements of the offense with which
he was charged[.]" Id. In affirming defendant's conviction for illegally wasting a game
animal in violation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-102 (1989), the court relied upon MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-20-701(1), which states, "No cause shall be reversed by reason of any error
committed by the trial court against the appellant unless the record shows that the error
was prejudicial."
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validity is bound to resurface.5 This article is intended as back-
ground for those practitioners of criminal law in Montana who will
be fighting in the forefront when the issue presents itself once
again.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF PLAIN ERROR IN MONTANA
Montana adheres to the universal rule that an error not
brought to the attention of the trial court is waived on appeal.'
The purpose of this rule is to ensure that trials, especially criminal
trials, will be as free of error as possible by giving the trial judge
the opportunity to correct errors at the time they occur.' In this
way, a solid record is preserved for appeal and society's resources
are utilized most efficiently.. The general rule does not exist with-
out exceptions, however, and Montana's exceptions are found in
both the statutory and common law.' Prior to 1983, the statutory
exception applicable to criminal cases provided that "[d]efects af-
fecting jurisdictional or constitutional rights may be noticed [on
appeal] although they were not brought to the attention of the
trial court."9 This statute has been referred to as the rule of "plain
error.""I A similar provision also existed in the rules of evidence."
5. The majority in Huebner indicated that, had the facts of the case been different,
the alleged errors regarding jury instructions might have presented a constitutional due pro-
cess violation. Huebner, at -,'827 P.2d at 1264. Accordingly, given the right factual situa-
tion the court will be forced to address the requirements of MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-20-
701(2), and the constitutional validity of that statute.
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-20-104 (1991). See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 26.5, at 251-54 (1984).
7. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 251; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) reh'g
denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 (1965) rehg denied, 380
U.S. 926 (1965); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1955) reh'g denied, 350 U.S. 955
(1955); United States v. Griffin, 699 F.2d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir. 1983).
8. See Halldorson v. Halldorson, 175 Mont. 170, 573 P.2d 169 (1977), wherein the
court announced the following rule:
Ordinarily errors not raised below will not be considered on appeal, however
this rule is subject to the exception that when the question is raised for the first
time on appeal it relates to the fundamental rights of the parties. ...
In adopting the "plain error" doctrine we believe that appellate courts have a
duty to determine whether the parties before them have been denied substantial
justice by the trial court, and when that has occurred we can, within our sound
discretion, consider whether the trial court has deprived a litigant of a fair and
impartial trial, even th6ugh no objection was made to the conduct during the trial.
Id. at 173-74, 573 P.2d at 171-72.
9. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-20-702 (1981).
10. See State v. Smith, 208 Mont. 66, 71, 676 P.2d 185, 188 (1984), wherein the court
stated:
Defendant failed to object to this exchange at the time of trial, but wishes to raise
it now on appeal. Section 46-20-104, MCA, provides that failure to make a timely
2
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In 1983, however, the legislature effectively abolished the statutory
rule of plain error contained in section 46-20-702.2 The law now
provides:
No claim alleging an error affecting jurisdictional or constitu-
tional rights may be noticed on appeal, if the alleged error was
not objected to as provided in 46-20-104, unless the defendant
establishes that the error was prejudicial as to his guilt or punish-
ment and that: (a) the right asserted in the claim did not exist at
the time of the trial and has been determined to be retroactive in
its application; (b) the prosecutor, the judge, or a law enforce-
ment agency suppressed evidence from the defendant or his at-
torney that prevented the claim from being raised and disposed
of; or (c) material and controlling facts upon which the claim is
predicated were not known to the defendant or his attorney and
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.1 3
This article is concerned with only that portion of the above stat-
ute which addresses errors affecting constitutional rights.14
As of 1983, Montana has been one of the few jurisdictions
objection at the time of trial constitutes a waiver of the objection and it may not
be raised on appeal. Although counsel on appeal (who was not trial counsel) recog-
nizes this waiver, he nonetheless argues that we should consider the issue and
reverse by application of the "plain error rule" contained in section 46-20-702,
MCA. Under the "plain error rule," jurisdictional and constitutional errors at trial
may be reviewed even though the injured party did not object at the time of trial.
The rule is therefore an exception to the waiver rule of section 46-20-104, MCA.
11. Rule 103(d) of the Montana Rules of Evidence states: "Nothing in this rule pre-
cludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not
brought to the attention of the court."
12. This occurred with the passage of Senate Bill 2, entitled: "An Act Prohibiting,
Except Under Certain Circumstances, Appellate Review of Alleged Errors Not Objected to
During a Criminal Trial; Amending Sections 46-20-104 and 46-20-702, MCA."
13. MONT. CODE. ANN § 46-20-701(2) (1991). The rule of plain error in Montana Rule
of Evidence 103(d) was not altered by Senate Bill 2 and remains in effect today. The rule
contained therein is arguably inapplicable beyond evidentiary matters which can be decided
upon the record, although the scope of the rule's application has not been formally ad-
dressed by the court. However, to construe Rule 103(d) beyond that application renders the
limitations in MONT. CODE. ANN § 46-20-701(2) without effect or meaning.
14. To the extent that MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-20-701(2) purports to waive jurisdic-
tional defects in a criminal prosecution, its validity is suspect. Case law uniformly estab-
lishes that jurisdiction cannot be waived and that appellate courts have a duty, sua sponte,
to inquire not only into their own jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction of the trial court as well.
See Wendling v. Southwest Say. and Loan,.694 P.2d 1213 (Ariz. 1984); People v. Lockhart,
699 P.2d 1332 (Colo. 1985); Simpson v. Departmerit of Land and Natural Resources, 791
P.2d 1267 (Haw. 1990); H & V Eng'r, Inc. v. Idaho St. Bd. of Prof. Eng'rs and Land Survey-
ors, 747 P.2d 55 (Idaho 1987); Long v. Riggs, 617 P.2d 1270 (Kan. 1980); State v. Wisniew-
ski, 708 P.2d 1031 (N.M. 1985); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Duerksen, 810 P.2d 1308
(Okla. 1991); Blundell v. Holm, 698 P.2d 981 (Or. 1985); Robbins v. South Cheyenne Water
and Sewage Dist., 792 P.2d 1380 (Wyo. 1990). See also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 253-54.
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which does not recognize a rule of plain error either at common
law or by statute.'6 There were several reasons for the 1983 change.
Supporters of the change believed that by limiting the exceptions
to the general rule of waiver, defense attorneys would be discour-
aged from planting error in the record to later serve as a basis for
appeal. According to those testifying before the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees, this occurred primarily in capital cases,"a
undoubtedly as a tactic to delay an execution date as long as
possible.
Although not explicitly discussed in committee, the limited ex-
ceptions to the contemporaneous objection requirement proposed
in Senate Bill 2 also serve to immunize state court rulings from
collateral attack in federal court. State court review is not the final
avenue of relief for an increasing number of criminal defendants.
Many defendants pursue federal habeas corpus relief, alleging that
they are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.' 7 Federal courts will decline to en-
tertain a habeas petition, however, if the state court expressly re-
lied upon a rule of procedural default in refusing to address the
merits of the claim.'" A federal habeas petitioner must demon-
strate the cause for his default and resulting prejudice to obtain
review of his federal claims, unless it can be shown that the peti-
tioner is "actually innocent."' 9
To warrant federal abstention, the state court must regularly
and consistently apply its procedural rules, including the rule of
15. See, e.g., State v. Bird, 708 P.2d 946 (Kan. 1985); Commonwealth v. Clair, 326
A.2d 272 (Pa. 1974). See 3 LAFAVE supra note 6, at 255.
16. Senate Judiciary Committee Minutes of January 19, 1983 at 2.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
18. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262
(1989). In Ylst, the Court explained:
When a state-law default prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a
federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court. [Citations
omitted]. ...
State procedural bars are not immortal however; they may expire because of
later actions by state courts. If the last state court to be presented with a particu-
lar federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal court review
that might otherwise have been available.
Id. at 2593.
19. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87; Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 448; Cole-
man v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 27 (1991); Armadeo v.
Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1988); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-92 (1986); Reed v.
Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1983); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982); Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536, 541-42 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1973); Anselmo v.
Sumner, 882 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1989); Roberts v. Arave, 847 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir.
1988).
[Vol. 53
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waiver and its exceptions.20 If procedural rules are applied on an
ad hoc basis, federal courts will not respect the state's "adequate
and independent" state procedural ground, since "a state proce-
dural ground is not 'adequate' unless the procedural rule is 'strictly
or regularly followed.' "21 The strict exceptions to the waiver rule
outlined in section 46-20-701(2) more effectively ensure consistent
application of Montana's procedural rules than a rule of plain er-
ror. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court boldly asserted when it
abolished the common law rule of plain error because of its hap-
hazard application:
[T]he theory [of plain error] has never developed into a princi-
pled test, but has remained essentially a vehicle for reversal when
the predilections of a majority of an appellate court are offended.
The theory has been formulated in terms of what a particular
majority of an appellate court considers basic or fundamental.
Such a test is unworkable when neither the test itself nor the case
law applying it develop a predictable, neutrally-applied standard.
We conclude that basic and fundamental error has no place
in our modern system of jurisprudence. This doctrine, which may
in the past have been acceptable, has become an impediment to
the efficient administration of our judicial system. Basic and fun-
damental error will therefore no longer be recognized as a ground
for consideration on appeal of allegedly erroneous jury instruc-
tions; a specific exception must be taken.
2 2
20. State courts must consistently and regularly apply state procedural bars in order
to successfully avoid subsequent collateral attack by federal courts. See Johnson v. Missis-
sippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587-88 (1988) (rejecting the state's argument that the state court's ruling
should be respected because a state's procedural ground is not "adequate" unless it is
"strictly or regularly followed"). In addition, the state court must clearly articulate the pro-
cedural basis for its ruling. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. at 2594-96.
21. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 146, 149 (1964)) In Johnson, the Supreme Court rejected the state's procedural bar
argument because of inconsistent application of the state's procedural rules, stating, "We
find no evidence that the procedural bar relied on by the Mississippi Supreme Court here
has been consistently or regularly applied. Rather, the weight of Mississippi law is to the
contrary." Johnson, 486 U.S. at 587.
22. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1974). Quoting this pas-
sage from Dilliplaine, one commentator observed that:
[tihis statement, remarkable in its candor, acknowledges that appellate courts ig-
nore a basic requirement of the appellate process when they make exceptions to
procedural rules for reasons they describe as "plain," "basic," "fundamental er-
ror," or "in the interests of justice." Appellate judges must recognize that they
cannot render decisions that apply only to the facts of one case. Precedent and
stare decisis are essential features of a common-law system. Appellate courts un-
dercut the entire system when they ignore the precedential value of cases.
Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla
Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (1987).
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III. INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE RULES SIGNALS UNREST
Unfortunately, the Montana Supreme Court has not been con-
sistent in its application of the procedural rules. In a number of
cases since the passage of Senate Bill 2, the court has acknowl-
edged that the statutory rule of plain error no longer exists and
that criminal defendants are no longer entitled to assert errors on
appeal unless the statutory factors of section 46-20-701(2) are
met.2 3 In other cases, however, the court has disregarded the stat-
ute altogether, and has relied upon its "inherent authority" to re-
view and, if necessary, reverse a conviction under the rule of plain
error.24 In these cases, the court has mistakenly assumed that the
doctrine of plain error and the statutory rule strictly limiting ap-
pellate review of errors not objected to at trial compatibly coexist,
and that either may be applied depending upon the facts of the
case. However, the court's desire to intervene on behalf of criminal
defendants in any one case, despite the defendant's noncompliance
with procedural rules, jeopardizes the adequacy of those rules in all
other cases and subjects the state court's decisions to federal re-
view whether or not the court considered the merits of the claims.
These considerations alone should be sufficient to command the
supreme court's attention when applying the legislature's rules of
default in future cases.
The legislature's rules designed to limit the scope of appellate
review may be in jeopardy, however, if the court pursues the path
outlined by the dissenting justice in Huebner. Justice McDonough,
a delegate to the 1972 Constitutional Convention, sharply criti-
cized the legislature's act of initiating what he considered to be a
rule of appellate procedure, a task which, he posited, belongs solely
to the judicial branch of government.25 Relying upon the scope of
supreme court jurisdiction granted in the 1972 Constitution, Jus-
tice McDonough proposes that the legislature has no authority to
initiate rules of procedure, but rather can only veto rules promul-
23. State v. Staat, No. 91-119 (Mont. filed March 27, 1991); State v. Kills on Top, 243
Mont. 56, 793 P.2d 1273 (1990) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2910 (1990) (a death penalty case);
State v. Larson, 240 Mont. 203,783 P.2d 416 (1989); State v. Blalock, 232 Mont. 223, 756
P.2d 454 (1988); State v. Smith, 228 Mont. 258, 742 P.2d 451 (1987); State v. St. Goddard,
226 Mont. 158, 734 P.2d 680 (1987); State v. Cain, 220 Mont. 509, 717 P.2d 15 (1986).
24. State v. Wilkins, 229 Mont. 78, 746 P.2d 588 (1988); State v. Flamm, 215 Mont.
466, 746 P.2d 588 (1986); State v. Harris, 209 Mont. 511, 682 P.2d 159 (1984); State v.
Smith, 208 Mont. 66, 676 P.2d 185 (1984).
25. Huebner, at -, 827 P.2d at 1269. Justice McDonough was apparently unper-
suaded by the other arguments of defense counsel and amicus curiae that the legislature's
limitations on the right of appeal violated a criminal defendant's due process rights, and
unconstitutionally interfered with the appellate court's grant of supervisory power over all
courts in MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(2) (1972).
[Vol. 53
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gated by the judiciary. By enacting section 46-20-701(2) Justice
McDonough suggests that the legislature has violated the separa-
tion of powers clause of our Constitution.26
It is very possible that a future majority will accept the dis-
sent's reasoning and invalidate the restrictions in section 46-20-
701(2) in favor of a rule of "plain error." The court's haphazard
rulings indicate that it is not comfortable with a rule which,
strictly applied, substantially limits its opportunity to correct er-
rors of constitutional import simply because a proper objection was
not registered. The court is obviously grasping for some degree of
autonomy to decide which errors deserve the court's attention and
which do not, without legislative intervention. Justice McDonough
proposes that this can be accomplished by invalidating the legisla-
tive rule and relying upon the common law rule of plain error pro-
nounced in 1977 in Halldorson.27 He reasons that, since the legisla-
ture did not exercise its veto power in either of the two sessions
following that decision, the rule of plain error pronounced therein
is still intact. 8 Justice McDonough's proposed solution, however,
presents problems of its own with respect to the separation of pow-
ers issue.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT INVALIDATE THE
LEGISLATURE'S RESTRICTIONS ON THE SCOPE OF APPEAL IN FAVOR
OF A JUDICIALLY CREATED RULE OF PLAIN ERROR
The judiciary's constitutional grant of rulemaking authority is
not absolute. The constitutional delegates provided that judicial
rules be subject to legislative veto in either of the two sessions fol-
lowing promulgation in order to preserve the system of checks and
balances inherent in our tripartite system of government. 9 The
delegates' primary concern was that the judiciary would extend its
rulemaking authority into substantive areas of the law.30
26. Huebner, at -, 827 P.2d at 1269. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(3) (1972) provides
that the supreme court "may make rules governing appellate procedure, practice and proce-
dure for all courts, admission to the bar and the conduct of its members. Rules of procedure
shall be subject to disapproval by the legislature in either of the two sessions following pro-
mulgation." MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides that "[tihe power of the government of this
state is divided into three distinct branches-legislative, executive, and judicial. No person
or persons charged with the exercise of power properly belonging to one branch shall exer-
cise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution
expressly directed or permitted."
27. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
28. Huebner, at -, 827 P.2d at 1269.
29. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (3); MONT. CONST. art. III § 1 (1972); see Constitutional
Convention Verbatim Transcript of February 26, 1972 at 1021-22, 1037, 1072.
30. Constitutional Convention Verbatim Transcript of February 26, 1972 at 1021-22,
1992]
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Whether a rule limiting the right and scope of appeal is sub-
stantive or procedural, the delicate balance between judicial and
legislative functioning is threatened by a suggestion that the legis-
lature's opportunity to veto the judicially created rule of plain er-
ror in Halldorson has come and gone. By insisting that the rule of
plain error in Halldorson is controlling, the dissent implies that
procedural rules may be announced in supreme court opinions
rather than through the usual rulemaking process, which entails
the issuance of a formal order signed by all members of the court
and publication of the new rule by the code commissioner as re-
quired by law." A supreme court rule announced in opinion is pre-
sumably less conspicuous, and consequently less prone to legisla-
tive scrutiny, than a rule which is formally designated in the code
book.
If a future majority falls back on the rule of plain error an-
nounced in Halldorson, it will effectively circumvent -the system of
checks and balances which is specifically built into the constitu-
tional grant of judicial rulemaking authority. The only way to
avoid this result is for the court to replace section 46-20-701(2)
with a rule of plain error adopted by supreme court order and sub-
ject to legislative veto in the two sessions following promulgation.
This alternative will most likely not appeal to the judiciary, since
it is entirely possible that a judicially created rule of "plain error"
would be vetoed on the ground that the rule invades the legisla-
ture's authority to make substantive law. 2 Despite this potential
for deadlock, however, the court cannot and should not circumvent
the normal rulemaking process in order to gain the upper hand
over a rule of plain error.
One solution not considered by the dissent in Huebner would
1037, 1072. Judicial overreaching is a primary concern of states adopting a constitutional
provision which grants judicial rulemaking authority, not because courts set out to make
rules governing substantive law as such, but because substance and procedure are "so inex-
tricably interwoven." A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Ju-
dicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1958).
The fact that the judiciary enjoys a constitutional grant of rulemaking authority, whether or
not that authority is subject to legislative veto, does not divest the legislature of its power to
make substantive law. A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, at 14, 17; Charles W. Joiner
& Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55
MIcH. L. REV. 623, 634 (1957); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446,
466 (1946); Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat
Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924).
31. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 1-11-204(2)(k) requires that the code commissioner prepare
for publication in the Montana Code Annotated the "rules of civil, criminal, and appellate
procedure and other rules of procedure the Montana supreme court may adopt .... "
32. See Daou v. Harris, 678 P.2d 934 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Slatter, 423 N.E.2d 100
(Ohio 1981); State v. Birmingham, 392 P.2d 775 (Ariz. 1964).
230 [Vol. 53
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be to leave the legislature's rule intact as a reasonable restriction
on the right of appeal, recognizing that the court's authority to
correct error in a particularly egregious case is not limited thereby.
The court must understand that it need not invalidate section 46-
20-701(2) in favor of a rule of "plain error" in order to maintain
judicial integrity and its rulemaking function. Whether judicially
or legislatively created, a rule of plain error is not a prerequisite to
appellate jurisdiction .3  In cases where a defect in the trial process
so fundamentally affects its fairness as to call the jury's verdict
into question, the appellate court not only has the inherent power,
but a duty to step in to protect the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants.3 4 Surely all parties, including the people of Montana,
have a vital interest in seeing that trials serve their truthseeking
function and that innocent persons are not convicted.
The court has previously exhibited a willingness to honor leg-
islative enactments which aid in the administration of the judici-
ary's rulemaking function.3 5 Given the problems inherent in a rule
of plain error, our court should be willing to acknowledge and con-
sistently apply the narrow exceptions to the waiver rule which the
legislature has set forth. The unpredictable nature of its prior
opinions demands this result.
V. CONCLUSION
The Huebner case is significant because it is the first time the
court has examined its historical unwillingness to consistently ap-
ply the rules of procedural default and the effect of this practice on
33. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) ("a plain error standard is unnecessary to
correct miscarriages of justice"); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941).
34. See Wilson v. State, 51 N.E.2d 848, 856 (Ind. 1943), wherein the court described
the interplay between rules of procedure and inherent authority:
Ordinarily, procedural rules must be observed by litigants and may not be ignored
by reviewing courts. To hold otherwise would invite appeals and violate prece-
dents that have given necessary order and stability to our appellate practice. But
when it is made to appear by a record before us that a so-called trial did not meet
the requirements of due process of law, it is within the power of this court to take
cognizance of the errors that resulted in depriving the appellant of his constitu-
tional rights.
Id. Accord People v. Dorrikas, 92 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Mich. 1958) ("[tlhe inherent power of
this Court to prevent fundamental injustice is not limited by what appellant is entitled to as
a matter of right"); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. at 557.
35. This was done in Kradolfer v. Smith, 246 Mont. 210, 213-15, 805 P.2d 1266, 1268-
69 (1990), where the court refused to invalidate an attorney license tax imposed by the
legislature on the ground that the tax invaded the court's exclusive authority to regulate the
practice of law. By so doing, the court noted that it was aiding judicial power rather than
surrendering its constitutional grant of authority.
19921
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the finality of its decisions in federal court. From now on, the
court's failure to adhere to the waiver rule and its limited excep-
tions cannot be excused as oversight. Future invocation of a rule of
"plain error" must be viewed as an intentional disregard of the leg-
islature's rules defining the right and scope of appeal in criminal
cases.
To declare section 46-20-701(2) invalid only compounds the
confusion between the role of the legislature and the inherent au-
thority of the appellate court. In the final analysis, the supreme
court retains the inherent authority to correct errors which are so
fundamentally egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
regardless of whether a rule of plain error is in place or not. In
those cases where the jury's verdict is suspect, the supreme court
can and should review errors affecting constitutional rights despite
the lack of a proper objection without reference to a statutory or
common law rule of plain error. In all other cases, however, the
court should be unequivocal in its reliance upon the strict require-
ments of Montana Code Annotated section 46-20-701(2). Only then
will our court's rulings gain the respect they are due in the federal
system. It is the integrity of the court's decisions, not its inherent
authority, which As at stake.
232 [Vol. 53
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